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PROFESSIONAL CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN
MEDICINE WITH ATTENTION TO REFERRAL
T.A. Cavanaugh†
I.

INTRODUCTION

At the University of Notre Dame’s 2009 commencement, President
Obama proposed to “honor the conscience of those who disagree with
abortion and draft a sensible conscience clause, and make sure that all
of our health care policies are grounded not only in sound science but
also in clear ethics as well as respect for the equality of women.”1
This paper takes up the President’s suggestion by addressing conscientious objection in medicine. In what follows, this paper presents
the principal features of a sensible clause while elaborating upon the
need to extend conscientious objection to include referral, a particularly
controverted claim.
What is a sensible conscience clause? First, one needs to distinguish
professional conscientious objection in medicine from conscientious
objection in employment more generally. The former concerns those
who have publicly, or pro fateri, said what they stand for: professionals.2 They have articulated and publicly stated an account of medical care that delimits what they take to be within and without the
practice to which they commit themselves. Most importantly, this
† I gratefully acknowledge the very helpful comments of the participants at the BYU
Law School’s February 2010 Symposium on the Future of Rights of Conscience in Health Care. I
thank BYU Law School and University Faculty for Life for sponsoring the Symposium. I particularly thank Professors Richard Myers and Lynn Wardle (the latter’s hospitality while at BYU
set an insuperable standard for all future conferences). I express gratitude to Professor Guy
Micco, M.D. of U.C. Berkeley’s School of Public Health for reading and commenting upon earlier
versions of this article. I also thank participants in UFL’s 2009 Life and Learning Conference
who helpfully responded to an earlier version of this paper. I remain entirely responsible for
its deficiencies.
1. President Barack Obama, Commencement Address at the University of Notre Dame
(May 17, 2009), in 39 ORIGINS 33, 36 (2009).
2. See Hugh Walters, The Meaning of Words in the New Health Service, 88 J. ROYAL
SOC’Y MED. 365, 366 (1995) (“The word profession comes from the Latin pro fateri which means
‘to bear witness on behalf of . . .’ .” (ellipses in original)).
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account includes their conceptions of themselves as medical practitioners and what constitutes a patient, a disease, health, and medical
therapy. Physicians, nurses, and pharmacists are medical professionals; ultrasound, radiology, and surgical technicians are not. A
sensible medical conscience clause bears on the former. Conscientious
objection in employment more generally would address the latter,
just as it would address the issue of, for example, Islamic taxi drivers’ religiously-based objections to transporting passengers carrying
alcohol.3 Thus, what follows concerns professional conscientious
objection in medicine.
This account understands a profession to have an independent
character autonomous from what law permits and society accepts.
While there is pluralism within professions concerning particulars,
and, therefore, disputes within the professions concerning their selfconceptions, a profession and professionals, as such, always stand for
something more than the efficient use of skill. Put most generally,
this something more amounts to their view of the good they seek and
the bad they avoid, or, their ethic. With this distinction in mind, and
noting that conscientious objection bears on otherwise legal patient
requests, the following outlines a conscience clause for medical professionals. After delineating conscientious objection, this Article will
present the obligations attending it.

3. In Minneapolis, Minn., approximately two-thirds of cab drivers are Islamic Somalis.
According to certain Muslim clerics influential in Minneapolis, the Koran’s prohibition against
drinking alcohol extends to transporting alcohol. While other clerics dispute this interpretation,
some Muslim cab drivers at the Minneapolis airport refused to transport passengers openly
carrying alcohol from the duty-free airport stores. Stephanie Simon, Where Faith and Work
Collide, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2007, at A10. In April of 2007, the Minnesota Airports Commissioners
decided that a taxi driver must transport passengers with alcohol. Dolal v. Metro. Airports
Comm’n, No. 07-1657 slip op. at 4 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2008). Now if a driver were to refuse
a fare on any grounds, his work license is to be suspended for thirty days; a subsequent refusal
is to result in a two-year suspension. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., METROPOLITAN AIRPORTS
COMMISSION, ORDINANCE 106 § 3.1 (2007). The policy was appealed to the Minnesota Court of
Appeals, which in September of 2008 ratified a lower court’s ruling that it was legitimate
because the taxi drivers did not suffer irreparable harm. Dolal, No. 07-1657, at 7– 8. Although
not the topic of this paper, this seems like an unenlightened, unimaginative resolution of the
dispute. Given that there were typically more taxis than customers at the airport and that
problems arose fewer than a dozen times a month, a variety of resolutions presented themselves,
including having non-objecting drivers jump the taxi-line when an objection arose. Id. at 3–4.
This, in conjunction with a policy that once a driver takes a fare he must bring the fare to her
destination, would have resolved the conflict. Id.
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II. GENERAL FEATURES OF A SENSIBLE CONSCIENCE CLAUSE
First, the professional objects based upon her professed account of
medicine. Her account is public, promulgated, graspable by others,
and scientifically-grounded. The objector must be capable of giving
reasons accessible to others, in contrast to asserting an entirely personal
stance. These reasons must refer to empirically grounded concepts of
health, disease, the subject of both (the patient), the goals of medicine,
its capabilities, and its boundaries. So, for example, an obstetrician
who objects to circumcising a healthy newborn male may do so based
upon his account of bodily integrity and the proper functioning of
organs. For similar reasons, a nurse may object to being involved in a
sterilization post-caesarian section. A pharmacist in Oregon or Washington might object to a terminally ill cancer patient’s legal request to
fill a lethal prescription for physician-assisted suicide in terms of life
not itself being a disease. An anesthesiologist might object to her
participation in capital punishment by reference to her account of the
very concept of a patient and of sickness. In doing so, each of these
professionals offers a reason-based explanation available to others for
objecting to the relevant request. Professionals offer such explanations
not in terms of exclusively personal beliefs, but rather, in terms of
accessible, albeit controverted, answers to the central questions of
medical practice. Those questions include: What is medicine? What
is a patient? What is a disease? What is health? And what goals can
and ought medicine to serve? 4
Because a sensible conscience clause must be grounded in a
professed account of medicine, it does not cover, for example,
objecting to relieving a patient’s pain based on one’s religious belief in
pain’s redemptive value or one’s experiential belief that pain builds
character. It does not extend to an obstetrician who considers anesthesia during labor objectionable based upon his religious conviction
that Genesis 3:16 5 requires that labor be redemptively painful. Nor
does it encompass the profane belief in pain as character-building.
Sensible objection requires that one’s grounds be both reason-based
4. Sixty years ago, practitioners widely shared a profession of medicine roughly
corresponding to the Hippocratic ethic. Today, one finds numerous oaths, and, by implication,
professions. For a study of the variety amongst oaths in all accredited U.S. allopathic and
osteopathic medical schools as of 2000, see Audiey C. Kao & Kayhan P. Parsi, Content Analyses
of Oaths Administered at U.S. Medical Schools in 2000, 79 ACAD. MED. 882, 882–86 (2004).
5. Genesis 3:16 (Revised Standard, Catholic Edition) (“[I]n pain you shall bring forth
children.”).
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and medical. A religious belief in the redemptive value of pain is
neither reason-based nor medical. Alternatively, a belief in pain as
character-building may be reason-based, but not medical. Thus, such
nonmedical, non-reason-based convictions do not ground professional
conscientious objection.
The exclusion of profane, nonmedical-based convictions does not
significantly depart from current statutes concerning conscientious
objection in medicine. However, ruling out exclusively religious
convictions importantly differs from current federal conscientious
objection statutes, which explicitly mention religious beliefs as a
basis for conscientious objection.6 Accordingly, it requires comment. A
sensible conscience clause for medical professionals does not extend to
every instance of conscientious objection that society may be willing
to grant to individuals. As noted, an employee may have a claim to
conscientious objection in employment just as a citizen may have one
to military-service or other forms of governmental-mandated action.7
These claims may be grounded in religion. These rights of objection
extend to the employee as an employee in the context of employment,
or to the citizen as a citizen in the context of citizenship. So also, the
professional has rights to conscientious objection in the context of
profession, which may materially differ from those of the employee
and those of the citizen. Most significantly, the professional’s actual
profession (her view of health, sickness, patients, and the purposes of
medicine) grounds professional conscientious objection.
As professions, medicine, law, and the clergy possess autonomy,
literally of a self-lawed character. For example, the legal and clerical
professions enjoy a virtually absolute degree of confidentiality not
found elsewhere in social relations.8 Professional conscientious objection in medicine is an instance of the autonomy of the professions
from what is simply legal.9 Professional conscientious objection differs
from religiously grounded objection by being reason-based, and there6. See Health Programs Extension (The Church Amendment) Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C.
§ 300a-7 (2006) (referring to “religious beliefs or moral convictions”).
7. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 319 U.S. 624, 628–630 (1943); Newdow v. Rio Linda
Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2010) (both cases discussing requirement that U.S.
school children salute or pledge allegiance to the American flag).
8. In this respect, the defeasible confidentiality in medicine differs from its counterparts
in law and religion, thus indicating differences within the professions.
9. From the legality of an intervention, one may not conclude that a professional must
acquiesce to a patient’s request for the intervention. The criteria, in terms of which one
determines legality, have little to no bearing on the practitioner’s profession concerning health,
sickness, and the ends of medicine.
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fore, in principle, accessible to all. To highlight exclusively religiouslybased conscientious objection to the neglect of professional conscientious objection renders conscientious objection a strange and
alien phenomenon to the nonreligious. More importantly, to do so
erroneously suggests that the professional has no positions concerning
the ethics of her own practice. The venerable Hippocratic Oath indicates otherwise.10 Regardless of one’s judgment concerning the Oath,
it points to a 2,400-year-old autonomous profession, as does professional conscientious objection more generally. Accordingly, we must
distinguish professional from religious conscientious objection.
Because the professed account of medicine must be empirically
grounded, new information and technological changes influence it. It
is scientifically grounded, not ideologically based. Accordingly, unlike
ideology, discoveries can change it. For example, to consider one
currently debated issue of conscience, some find emergency contraception (sometimes known as EC, the “morning after pill,” or by its
trade name Levonorgestrel11) morally problematic.12 They do so
because they believe it to have at least two mechanisms of operation
by which it prevents pregnancy: First, a contraceptive agency by
which it prevents ovulation and, thereby, fertilization of an ovum,
and second, an abortifacient mechanism by which it prevents the
fertilized ovum from implanting in the uterus. All acknowledge the
contraceptive mechanism. Dispute and some ambiguity attend the
second, putatively abortifacient mechanism.13 If it were to be established
that the currently favored emergency contraception, Levonorgestrel,
had no abortifacient mechanism, or if an alternative pill were developed that acted solely as a contraceptive, then one who finds abortion
professionally objectionable—while not objecting to contraception—
could with a clear conscience prescribe, fill, or administer it. Whatever
the case concerning this example, professional conscientious objection
must be evidence-based.

10. “I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a
suggestion to this effect.” HIPPOCRATES, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH (c. 400 B.C.), in ANCIENT
MEDICINE: SELECTED PAPERS OF LUDWIG EDELSTEIN 6 (Owsei Temkin & C. Lilian Temkin eds.,
Ludwig Edelstein trans. 1987).
11. Frequently Asked Questions, PLAN B ONE-STEP, http://www.planbonestep.com/planb-faq.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
12. See Peter J. Cataldo, The USCCB and Rape Protocols, 29 ETHICS & MEDICS 2 (2004),
reprinted in 72 LINACRE Q. 255, 255–58 (2005).
13. J.B. Stanford, Emergency Contraception: Overestimated Effectiveness and Questionable
Expectations, 83 CLINICAL PHARM. & THERAPEUTICS 19, 20 (2008).
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This brings us to the second feature of the clause, which addresses
a particularly difficult issue in determining the outlines of sensible
conscientious objection. Namely, may objection refer to specifics about
the patient or must it refer solely to a requested intervention?14
While there may be legitimate instances in which a professional
objects to performing some intervention based upon characteristics of
the patient —for example, a physician might prescribe contraceptives
while objecting to doing so for minors—such cases ought to be
regarded as exceptions to a general rule which focuses on objection to
specific interventions. Generally, the professional ought to object to a
requested intervention, not to the requestor. So, for example, if a
fertility doctor does not object to in vitro fertilization in terms of his
account of medical practice, he ought to provide it to all otherwise
medically-qualified patients.15 Generally, objection ought not employ
any nonmedical reference to the patient who makes the request.16 Ra14. This question resembles one encountered in discussions of conscientious objection to
military service. Namely, to be granted conscientious objector status, must an individual object
to all wars—be a thoroughgoing pacifist—or may he accept the justice of some wars while
objecting to the justice of others—be a subscriber to just war theory, also called selective
conscientious objection? Clearly, it is easier for society to administer the pacifist/non-pacifist
distinction (object to all wars/not object to all wars) than to extend conscientious objector status
to adherents of the just war theory (some wars are just while others are not). Indeed, the U.S.
Department of Defense policy, and apparently, U.S. law do not accept selective conscientious
objection. “An individual who desires to choose the war in which he or she will participate is
not a Conscientious Objector under the law. The individual’s objection must be to all wars
rather than a specific war.” DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INSTRUCTION NUMBER 1300.06, CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTORS § 3.5.1 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/ i1300_06.pdf.
15. See, e.g., N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc., v. San Diego Cnty. Superior Court,
189 P.3d 959, (Cal. 2008). A lesbian woman had sought and received fertility treatment. Id. at
963. While her doctors had no objections to prescribing medication to facilitate fertility nor to
referring her to a non-objecting physician, the doctors did object to performing intrauterine
insemination [hereinafter IUI]. Id. There was a factual dispute between the parties that was
never settled at court: The plaintiff asserted that the physicians objected to performing IUI in
light of her sexual orientation; the doctors claimed to object to inseminating a single woman. Id.
at 969–70. In effect, the court ruled that the basis upon which the physicians did not provide
the service was not relevant. Id. at 970. Their objection had the effect of discrimination based on
sexual orientation, regardless of their motive for objection. Id. The court held that while one
need not provide the relevant service, if one does offer it, it must be provided to all: “[D]efendant
physicians can simply refuse to perform the IUI medical procedure at issue here for any patient
of North Coast, the physicians’ employer. Or, . . . defendant physicians can avoid such a conflict
by ensuring that every patient requiring IUI receives ‘full and equal’ access to that medical
procedure though [sic] a North Coast physician lacking defendants’ religious objections.” Id. at
968–69 (quoting Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51(a), (b), 52(a) (2009)).
16. The medical versus nonmedical distinction is not an entirely bright one (and the
above-mentioned “medically-qualified patient” does not remain free of ambiguity). Many
would think it perfectly legitimate, perhaps even obligatory, for a fertility specialist to object to
providing interventions for a woman well past child-bearing age or to a woman based upon the
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ther, it solely considers the act requested. Medicine bandages the
wounds of the wounded, regardless of creed, character, race, gender,
sexual orientation, innocence, or guilt. Similarly, conscientious objection generally excludes scrutiny of the patient to whose request
the doctor objects.17
Third, conscientious objection extends from individuals to institutions. For institutions organically arise out of the association of
individuals who often share a professed account of medicine. As
Thoreau notes, “It is truly enough said, that a corporation has no
conscience; but a corporation of conscientious men is a corporation
with a conscience.”18 To prohibit the extension of conscientious objection to corporations or institutions is to thereby prohibit citizens
from associating conscientiously. So, just as a pharmacist may object
to filling a prescription for physician-assisted suicide, so also may a
pharmacy. Indeed, in the case of small pharmacies, the pharmacy is
often the pharmacist.
Fourth, and this point closely follows upon that just made, the
extension of conscientious objection to individuals in principle
amounts to an extension of conscientious objection to the entire
profession. For one professional after another may legitimately exercise conscientious objection to include the entire membership of the
profession. Simply because the law endorses the use of a medical
technology does not insure, and more importantly—given the profession’s autonomy from the law—ought it to insure that medical
professionals themselves agree with that use of their abilities.
This will understandably be a much-controverted claim, especially
given concerns about access to interventions in rural areas where one
typically finds fewer practitioners. Moreover, as some note, given
number of children she already has. In such cases, medical and nonmedical considerations
overlap. To take a more controversial case, consider a fertility specialist who limits his practice
to married heterosexual couples in light of his medical view that they alone suffer infertility.
Such a professional might reasonably maintain that he treats reproductive systems, which
systems are neither male nor female, but rather, the union of a male and a female. If he were
conscientiously to object to treating a single woman (or man), he would not thereby be importing
nonmedical reference to the patient. For fertility, and thereby, infertility, are medical
characteristics of heterosexual couples. Again, while such cases might be justifiable and while
society may be willing to accommodate them, they ought to be considered exceptions to the
general rule in which one objects to performing a specific intervention, not to performing it for
this patient.
17. See, e.g., id. at 968– 69; see also Wesley J. Smith, Pulling the Plug on the Conscience
Clause, FIRST THINGS, Dec. 2009, at 41, 43.
18. HENRY D. THOREAU, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1849), reprinted in ON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE:
AMERICAN ESSAYS, OLD AND NEW 11, 12–13 (Robert A. Goldwin ed., 3d prtg. 1973) (1968).
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that the medical professions enjoy monopoly-like control over the
controverted procedures and technologies, ought one grant conscientious objection to the profession itself, that is, allow conscientious
objection in principle to extend to all members?19
In light of this monopoly-like control some who would grant
conscientious objection to individuals would deny it both to institutions and to the profession in its entirety. However, as noted above,
because professionals constitute a profession and individuals by
association compose institutions, conscientious objection cannot be
limited to individuals. To do so disregards the individual’s associative
nature, as Professor Lynn Wardle notes: “To exclude institutional
health providers from conscience clause protection is merely an
indirect way of denying the conscience and morality of the individuals whose will and purposes the entities were created to effect.”20
Nonetheless, those who attend to the exclusive command the medical
professions enjoy over the relevant matters have a point. Medical
professions and institutions cannot, on the one hand, exert sole
control over technologies and, on the other, enjoy conscientious
objection concerning those interventions that have been legalized.
Thus, just as legislatures and voters may legalize the use of medical
technologies in manners rejected by the medical profession,21 they
may also legalize others to employ those interventions. Indeed, the
medical professions ought not to impede, and, as much as is consistent with their professional ethic, ought to endorse nonmedical
personnel being permitted to employ the relevant legalized technologies and interventions.
Consider a case requiring physician- and nurse-complicity in
capital punishment in the State of North Carolina.22 The Supreme
Court of North Carolina recently ruled that the North Carolina Medical
Board, which licenses physicians in the state, cannot restrict physicianparticipation in capital punishment to the physician being physically present at an execution.23 Rather, in opposition to the Medical
Board’s (on the face of things, principled and balanced) stance, the
19. For a discussion on the issue of monopoly and its bearing on conscientious objection
see Elizabeth Fenton & Loren Lomasky, Dispensing with Liberty: Conscientious Refusal and the
“Morning-After Pill,” 30 J. MED. & PHIL. 579, 579–92 (2005).
20. Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers, 14 J.
LEGAL MED. 177, 186 (1993).
21. See, e.g., N.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. N.C. Med. Bd., 675 S.E.2d 641, 643–45 (N.C. 2009).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 651.

AMLR.V9I1.CAVANAUGH.FINAL

Fall 2010]

2/16/2011 6:28 PM

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN MEDICINE

197

legislature can, as it does in N.C.G.S. §§ 15-190, require that a
physician, “monitor the essential body functions of the condemned
inmate and [ ] notify the Warden immediately upon his or her
determination that the inmate shows signs of undue pain or
suffering.”24 It could come about that all physicians object to this
participation in capital punishment (as it could develop that all
nurses and pharmacists also object). Indeed, in arriving at its stance,
the Medical Board noted that, “physician participation in capital
punishment is a departure from the ethics of the medical profession.”25
Additionally, the Medical Board cited the American Medical
Association’s Code of Medical Ethics opinion on capital punishment,
which distinguishes the personal opinion of the medical practitioner
concerning the morality of the death penalty from the ethic of “a
member of a profession dedicated to preserving life when there is
hope of doing so.”26 To protect conscientious objection and to insure
accessibility to the legalized intervention, legislatures that mandate
the use of medical technologies in capital punishment must extend
authority over such techniques to nonmedical persons. Thus, the
State of North Carolina, for example, ought to revisit the exclusive
control of medical professionals over the relevant technologies. The
same holds for other uses of putative medicine legislatures legalize.27
Fifth, conscientious objection is a two-way street. That is, conscientious objection protects both those who regard certain patient
requests as objectionable and those who consider providing the requested medical intervention to be legitimate or even required. One
finds this admirable feature in the Church Amendment of 1973, which
prevents discrimination against both those who perform abortions
and sterilizations and those who refuse to do so.28 A conscience clause
24. Id. (alteration in original).
25. Id. at 644.
26. Id. at 645 (quoting AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS
WITH ANNOTATION § 2.06: 20 (2008–2009 ed. 2008)).
27. Id. at 647 (“[E]xecutions are not medical procedures. . . .”). The logic of the prevailing
position being that, if executions are not medical procedures, then when the law requires
medical doctors actively to participate in them, the medical board has no jurisdiction. For,
according to this line of thinking, the physicians do not act in a professional capacity. What
ought one make of such a tortuous and, thereby, torturous line of reasoning? One possible
implication would be that the Department of Corrections and a majority of justices of the N.C.
Supreme Court recognize the autonomy of the medical profession in their very attempt to
suborn it. For our purposes, if a legislature wants to use medical expertise for a purpose
medical professionals do not share, the legislature does well to make alternative provisions in
light of that fact.
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) (2006).
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recognizes that there are competing professed accounts of medicine
and controverted interventions. As a two-way street, the conscience
clause acknowledges the legitimacy of conscience at the level of
institutions, while preventing institutions and individuals from discriminating against those whose consciences differ. So, for example, a
Catholic hospital that objects to the performance of abortions or
sterilizations on its premises may not deny privileges to an obstetrician
who does so elsewhere. Conscientious objection considers one’s own
conduct, not that of another. While a Catholic hospital might prefer to
have unanimity on this controverted matter amongst those who
practice within it, the hospital must extend to others the very
protection afforded to it and to those practitioners sharing its account
of medicine.
Sixth, conscientious objection encompasses more than simply not
performing the controverted intervention while in certain instances,
requiring some cooperation with the patient in his attempt to
achieve what he seeks. Working out the boundaries of conscientious
objection may be the most difficult task in reaching some political
consensus concerning what a sensible conscience clause looks like.
Most importantly, conscientious objection encompasses referrals.
Because some would permit professionals to object to performing
the controverted interventions while requiring referral, this merits
greater consideration.29
In order to discuss the extension of conscientious objection to
referral, a number of distinctions are in order. First, we must distinguish two cases: Namely, that of a patient with whom the professional
has no preexisting relationship and that of the patient with whom
there is a relationship prior to the controverted request.30 Second, we
must distinguish the act of referral from what we may call full
disclosure. By full disclosure, I refer to the need to inform fully the
patient of legally and medically available interventions. In my
consideration of the obligations attending conscientious objection, I
will attend to the obligation of the objecting professional to discuss
alternative options with the patient. Referral and full disclosure differ.
29. See, e.g., Adrienne Asch, Two Cheers for Conscience Exceptions, HASTINGS CTR. REP.,
Nov.–Dec. 2006, at 11, 12.
30. As I employ the phrase, a preexisting relationship requires an encounter between
professional and patient: The more such encounters, the more significant the relationship and
the greater the claims the patient has upon the physician. Simply having an appointment or
calling in a prescription to one rather than another pharmacy does not establish a preexisting
relationship.
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The objector need not refer, but he must disclose. Putting this distinction aside for the moment, let us consider the issue of referral with
respect to the two aforementioned cases.
Before considering these two cases, a prior question arises: Why
regard referral as at all objectionable? Given that professionals refer
for those interventions they do not perform, it is, at least on the face of
things, natural to suppose that an objecting professional would refer.
For, just as the internist refers ingrown toenails to a podiatrist, so also
would the objecting practitioner refer for physician-assisted suicide.
Moreover, the internist would refer in both cases for the same reason;
namely, because he does not perform the requested procedure. This
understandable, yet ultimately mistaken, view proposes that referral
ought to occur if one does not perform the relevant act, regardless of
the basis for not doing that act. This view fails to note, however, that
by referring one endorses the relevant act. The internist referring to
the podiatrist thereby approves of and, indeed, recommends the
podiatrist’s act to the patient. In the case of objection, since the professional does not consider the relevant request to be consonant with
his own professed account of health, sickness, and the ends, capabilities, and limits of medicine, he could not consistently refer the
patient to another. To do so would be to contradict one’s very objection to the request in the first place. A professional ethic cannot
coherently regard some act as out of bounds while referring to
another professional for the performance of that act. While a patient
might be gratified by an objecting professional’s referral, he would
rightly be puzzled by such a view of an ethical principle. For those
who apprehend the concept of a restrictive ethical principle understand it as prohibiting both one’s own act and one’s promotion of
another’s so acting.31 Thus, from the very nature of allegiance to an
ethical principle, conscientious objection extends to referral.32 In light
31. For a comparable view, see Michael D. Bayles, A Problem of Clean Hands: Refusal to
Provide Professional Services, 5 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 165, 165–81 (1979). Bayles notes, “The
argument against referring . . . appears consequentialist. . . . The consequentialism involved is
inescapable in morality, for it is the ‘consequentialism’ of claiming that it is better that wrongful
conduct not occur, that one ought not to assist in it . . . . The arguments are drawn from the
inescapable consequentialism of having moral principles.” Id. at 168.
32. Notably, this is one of the ways in which an ethical principle can differ from a religious
obligation. Consider a few religious observations. For example, on certain days, practicing
Catholics do not eat meat. Yet this religious duty does not prevent them from selling, providing, preparing, recommending, and in general promoting the eating of meat by others who
do not share their religion. Similarly, on the Sabbath, observant Jews refrain from certain
activities. This religious commitment does not prevent them, however, from accepting the
performance of such acts on their behalf by a volunteer who does not share their beliefs. So, for
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of this, return to the two above-mentioned cases. For the extension of
conscientious objection to referral in the two cases differs. If no preexisting relationship exists, the professional need not refer for the
reasons noted above. However, if the professional has a preexisting
relationship, he does have an obligation to insure that his patients are
aware of his stance. If he has failed in this respect and an existing
patient reasonably assumes him to be willing, the professional has
an obligation to refer if the patient so insists.33 For, absent notification
to the contrary, the patient has the reasonable belief that the
professional will perform or refer for the requested act. Moreover, the
patient has justifiably developed reliance upon the professional.
Were the professional not to refer, he would thereby violate the
patient’s honest dependence to which he contributed by not adequately communicating his objection. Accordingly, as will be noted
subsequently, professionals must scrupulously inform relevant parties
of their positions lest they create obligations based upon others’
reasonable reliance upon them.34 With the above exception in mind,
an objector need not refer.
While in the noted cases, conscientious objection encompasses
referral, it does not extend to nonprofessional, logistical tasks such as
the forwarding of medical records, or the return of a prescription
from a pharmacy.35 In an instance of conscientious objection, but for
the loss of time and the opportunity costs, the patient emerges no
worse off from the interaction with the objecting professional.36
example, while an observant Jew may not carry bottled water on a hike on the Sabbath, others
may offer to do so for him.
33. Here, patients may correctly assume that medical professionals legally can and do
provide an intervention they desire. Thus, an objecting professional has an obligation to inform
his patients of his conscientious objector status, lest they develop reasonable reliance upon him.
34. Some might point this out as inconsistent with the previous argument that objection
encompasses referral. In the envisioned case, the professional has gotten herself into a moral
dilemma where she will either violate her conscience by referring or violate her obligation to the
patient who has reasonably come to rely upon her. In either case, whatever she does will be
ethically problematic. By promulgating her stance to relevant parties, she can avoid this
dilemma. Others might object that referral when a preexisting relationship exists does not
adequately satisfy the obligations created by reliance. In such cases, if competent, ought not the
professional perform the relevant intervention? The answer to this question depends upon
particulars of the case such as how much of a burden referral poses to the patient, the elective
character of the intervention, and how grave a violation of her profession does the physician
regard the requested intervention in comparison to the wrong of reneging on her patient’s reliance.
35. Absent reliance, however, and for reasons comparable to those already noted concerning referral, a pharmacist need not call another pharmacy and communicate the contents of a
prescription.
36. Of course, the patient incurs no charges for the refusal.
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Yet, some who have recourse to conscientious objection might
object: Is not to acquiesce in the forwarding of medical records, the
release of prescriptions, and fully to disclose legal and medicallyaccepted options provided by other practitioners tantamount to a
referral or to moral complicity in the satisfaction of the requested
intervention? By so limiting conscientious objection has one given
with one hand and taken away with the other? No. Performing an
intervention, referring a patient to another to do the same, filling a
prescription, or communicating the contents of the same to another
so that it may be filled intimately involves one in the relevant matter.
One thereby acts with the purpose of ensuring the performance of the
act. The achievement of the disputed goal shapes and informs one’s
own act. Accordingly, one thereby becomes an accomplice to the act
to which one objects. For example, a referral must be to another
capable and willing to fulfill the contested request. That desideratum
structures one’s act of referral and, thereby, violates a well-formed
conscience. Transferring medical records or returning a prescription
does not, however, so deeply implicate one in the objectionable act.
One need not thereby intend or deliberate about how to achieve the
wrong to which one objects. The objectionable act itself does not
shape and determine those acts, which incidentally advance its
achievement. While such acts make it easier for the patient to satisfy
his request, they have only a modest determination to that goal.
Moreover, they are not necessary to insure its success. For example, if
prior to the objection, the patient incurred an insurance copayment,
one would reimburse the same. It is immaterial to conscientious
objection that the patient can use that same copayment to procure the
relevant request elsewhere. Absent the return of the copayment, or
return of a prescription, or transfer of medical records, the patient
could still secure the controverted intervention.37 In any case, conscientious objection does not extend to preventing the patient from
achieving what he seeks. Rather, it insures that the professional need
not violate her profession of medicine in her practice. To transfer a
medical record, to return a prescription, or to disclose legal options
that other professionals offer is not, thereby, to violate a well-formed
37. In cases of professional objection, and even more widely, the patient enjoys moral,
and, in some jurisdictions, legal, claims to copayments, prescriptions, and medical records. For
example, “Oklahoma explicitly states that a patient has a ‘property right’ in his or her
prescription . . . .” JILL MORRISON & GRETCHEN BORCHELT, DON’T TAKE “NO” FOR AN ANSWER: A
GUIDE TO PHARMACY REFUSAL LAWS, POLICIES AND PRACTICES 8 (2007), http://www.nwlc.org/
sites/default/files/pdfs/donttakeno2007.pdf. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 354 (West 2010).
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conscience. Thus, a professional may not invoke professional conscientious objection for such matters.
Seventh, conscientious objection extends to practitioners and to
those becoming practitioners. In terms of her chosen profession, a
student may object to learning medical interventions she regards as
incompatible with it. As yet to be professed and as one still learning
the relevant profession, the student must ensure that she has a proper
understanding of her chosen vocation and that her account has
sufficient bases in reason and in medicine. She does well to recognize
the plurality of views concerning what amounts to medical practice.
Moreover, the aspiring medical professional ought to confirm the
soundness of her view of medicine and its implications by seeking out
experienced practitioners and reflecting upon her views in the light of
their practice.
Finally, a sensible conscience clause does not take an ad hoc
approach to objection by singling out specific currently and widelyrecognized controverted interventions such as abortion and physicianassisted suicide.38 Rather, it attempts to establish an acknowledged
forum for the exercise of conscience in a milieu increasingly characterized by dissensus. In this respect, such a clause would differ
from the currently existing federal clauses.39 For these current federal
laws almost exclusively refer to abortion.40
A number of reasons recommend not so limiting protections of
conscience to specific interventions. First, by itself not singling out
any one controverted matter, the clause treats all parties equally. All
recognize that they may have recourse to the exception made for
conscience, if not now, perhaps at some future date. It does not require
38. For polling data concerning abortion, see Americans Split on Covering Abortion in
Insurance Plans that Use Federal Subsidies, ANGUS REID PUBLIC OPINION (Jan. 14, 2010),
http://www.visioncritical.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/2010.01.14_abortion_usa.pdf;
Lydia Saad, The New Normal on Abortion: Americans More “Pro-Life,” GALLUP (May 14, 2010),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/128036/new-normal-abortion-americans-pro-life.aspx. For polling
data concerning physician-assisted suicide, see generally Americans Split over Euthanasia and
Assisted Suicide, ANGUS REID PUBLIC OPINION (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.visioncritical.com/
wp-content/uploads/2010/02/2010.02.10_euthanasia_usa.pdf; Joseph Carroll, Public Divided over
Moral Acceptability of Doctor-Assisted Suicide, GALLUP (May 31, 2007), http://www.gallup.com/
poll/27727/public-divided-over-moral-acceptability-doctorassisted-suicide.aspx.
39. For the relevant federal protections of conscience, see 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2006);
Coats/Snowe Amendment of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 238n (2006); Consolidated Appropriations Act,
H.R. 2764, 110 Cong. § 508(d) (2008).
40. But see 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c)(2) (2006) (addressing nondiscrimination in federallyfunded research towards those who perform or refuse to perform “any lawful health service or
research activity,” including sterilization).
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an overly active imagination, extensive reading of Antigone, or that
one become a scholar of Anne Hutchinson’s trial to conjure up conditions in which a majority regards as legitimate some intervention
one considers abhorrent.41 Consider, for example, the aforementioned
case from North Carolina of legislatively mandated physician- and
nurse-participation in administering capital punishment,42 the prospect
of military physicians being asked to participate in torture, or the
mundane request that a pediatrician circumcise a healthy infant male
so that he “fits in” or “looks like Dad.” In light of such cases, many
can realize that they have need of and, thereby, can welcome a
conscientious objection clause.
Second, by not singling out any debated issue, the conscientious
objection clause itself avoids unnecessary controversy. The heat surrounding discussions of conscience derives entirely from that associated
with abortion. The important debate concerning abortion ought to be
entirely distinct from that concerning conscience. To confuse the two
equates to thinking that the legitimacy of a Quaker’s recourse to
conscientious objection depends upon the legitimacy of the specific
war in which he would otherwise serve. On the contrary, the reason
for extending to him a right of objection has nothing at all to do with
the justice or injustice of any particular war. Rather, it has to do
entirely with the relation between the individual and a legitimate
state. Enlightened individuals who regard war as legitimate realize
that the state might demand other acts of them to which they object.
Thus, they realize that they might have recourse to conscientious
objection just as the Quaker does. So also, distinguishing conscientious
objection in medicine from any one controverted issue allows those
who regard the profession as something more than a technique for the
provision of legally permitted acts to see the need for conscientious
objection. For the need arises simply from the autonomy of the pro41. See R.C. JEBB, SOPHOCLES: PLAYS: ANTIGONE (P.E. Easterling ed., Bristol Classical Press
2004) (1900); WINNIFRED KING RUGG, UNAFRAID: A LIFE OF ANNE HUTCHINSON 160–70 (1930).
Or, the converse: One regards as obligatory something the majority considers heinous. For the
purposes of this paper, medical conscientious objection concerns objections to acts one regards
as violating one’s profession of medicine (not prohibitions concerning medical acts one regards
as obligatory—a positive obligation to act). The latter might include the authorities—due to fear
of losing a practitioner in low supply during a plague—forbidding a physician from treating a
patient suffering from a highly contagious potentially lethal disease. Such cases are not the
concern of this paper, nor do they typify actual cases of medical conscientious objection. They
do, however, belong to the topic; a complete treatment would address them. I am inclined to
think that the lineaments of conscientious objection concerning positive obligations differ from
those regarding refraining from acting.
42. See N.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. N.C. Med. Bd., 657 S.E.2d 641, 645–47 (N.C. 2009).
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fession from the political and social fora in which it operates. Third,
by not limiting the clause to any one intervention, one makes room
for responses to unforeseen developments43 and less widely yet still
controverted matters.44
Fourth, and finally, all of the above aspects of a general conscience
clause strengthen the inherent fairness of such a clause and, thereby,
the political case to be made for it. For people can see that while they
may enjoy liberty in their invocation of conscience, they may also
incur costs when others with whom they differ invoke conscience in
refusing an intervention they request. So, for example, those who
oppose abortion may realize that a non-specific conscience clause,
which does not require them to perform or refer for abortion, will also
enable physicians who regard futile care to object to its provision.
Moreover, once legislated, it will be less likely to suffer the constant
tug of war fought over intervention-specific clauses. It will come to
be seen, as it ought to be, as part of the nature of medicine as an
autonomous profession with its own ethics.
III. THE DUTIES OF THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR
The above represent the outlines of a sensible clause that respects
claims to conscientious objection. Associated with rights are obligations. What duties accompany conscientious objection? To sum up
what follows: The obligations to the patient remain unchanged, but
for the denial of the contested request.
Specifically, what do these obligations entail? First, following
from the very meaning of professing—and to develop a point previously mooted—full disclosure imposes the obligation to promulgate
to the relevant parties one’s conscientious objection. This includes
one’s prospective and current patients, colleagues, employers, and
relevant institutions, for example hospitals and insurance companies.
With respect to patients, this bears on informed consent and patient
autonomy. Considering the recent referendum legalizing physicianassisted suicide in the State of Washington,45 absent an internist’s
43. For example, new technologies.
44. For example, routine infant male circumcision or the provision of what one regards as
futile interventions.
45. See Washington Death with Dignity Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.245.010–
70.245.904 (West 2009); Jacob Goldstein, Washington Passes Initiative 1000, Legalizing PhysicianAssisted Suicide, WALL ST. J. HEALTH BLOG (Nov. 5, 2008 8:46 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
health/2008/11/05/washington-passes-initiative-1000-legalizing-physician-assisted-suicide.
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noting his objection to the procedure, a current or prospective patient
might mistakenly assume that her doctor would agree to her request
for physician-assisted suicide at some future date. Were he to inform
her of his objection to doing so, she would have the opportunity to
make alternative arrangements, perhaps developing a physicianpatient relationship with a doctor whose views are more consonant
with hers. Moreover, by promulgating one’s conscientious objector
status, one avoids the previously noted problem of a moral dilemma resulting from a patient’s reasonable reliance, which would
require referral.
Second, conscientious objector status obliges the relevant professional to explain her reasons for her objection to those patients who
request further information. That is, conscientious objection itself
involves its own version of full disclosure based upon a patient’s
informed consent. This does not mean that the patient must consent
to the practitioner’s objection. Rather, it means that the patient is due
the offer of an explanation. This does not, however, amount to the
professional’s having a right to pontificate concerning the relevant
matter. Rather, the interested patient ought to receive some answer to
the question as to why the professional objects. Certainly, not all
patients will be interested to know why. Those who are not interested
ought not to be treated as captive audiences; those who do want to
know ought to receive a considerate and considered answer. In
discussion of one’s conscientious objection, full disclosure requires
that one note the controverted nature of the matter concerning which
one objects. One must bring to the patient’s attention that not all
medical professionals agree with one’s own view. As noted, if no
previous relationship exists, this does not require referral. It does,
however, require that one puts one’s own account of medicine into
the larger context that includes other, disagreeing professionals, in
virtue of which disagreement one resorts to conscientious objection.
The patient ought to emerge having a sense both of one’s grounds for
objecting and of the pluralism found in medicine regarding the
controverted matter. This constitutes the analogue of informed consent
for non-controverted medical care. A professional would have failed in
this respect were a patient to emerge from the interaction thinking that
the medical profession as a whole rejected the requested intervention.46

46. If a patient does not wish to discuss the professional’s conscientious objection, the
professional still must attempt to insure that the patient leaves the clinical encounter realizing
the legality of the requested intervention and that other professionals might not object to it.
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Third, conscientious objector status bears exclusively on the
patient’s contested request; it does not relate to the other care the
physician, nurse, or pharmacist provides for the patient. If a relationship exists with the patient, then the obligation of non-abandonment
mandates that prior to alternative arrangements being in place for the
controverted intervention, the physician, nurse, or pharmacist must
provide care to which she does not object. So, for example, the
internist who objects to her terminally ill patient’s considered request
for physician-assisted suicide does not thereby abdicate her responsibility to care for that patient otherwise until the patient finds an
alternative physician.
Fourth, conscientious objector status requires the continued
maintenance of confidentiality, particularly with respect to the fact
that the professional objects to something the patient requests. For
example, a woman who requests emergency contraception at the
counter of an objecting pharmacist does not thereby forfeit any of her
claims regarding discretion and confidentiality concerning that very
communication with the pharmacist. Indeed, because such situations
are fraught with potential for embarrassment and the untoward
interest of others, the professional must strenuously and scrupulously
protect the patient’s privacy specifically concerning the patient’s
request and the practitioner’s conscientious objection.
Finally, as earlier noted, while conscientious objection does not
require referral to a third party who will abide by the patient’s request,
it does require transfer of relevant documents, returning a prescription, and, more generally, acts which, while they may result in
the act to which one objects, do not require one to aim at that act.
Professional conscientious objection finds its basis in medical
practitioners’ ancient practice of publicly expressing their accounts of
health, sickness, caring, and curing for which they stand. A sensible
conscience clause recognizes both the privileges and responsibilities
attending such a profession.

